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Abstract  
We study the way in which public procurement by big research infrastructures enhances suppliers’ per-
formance. Using survey data on 669 CERN suppliers, we built a unique data set to analyse, through an 
ordered logit model and Bayesian networks, the determinants of suppliers’ sales, profits and develop-
ment activities. We find that collaborative relations between CERN and its suppliers improve suppliers’ 
performance and increase positive spill overs along the supply chain. This suggests that public procure-
ment for innovation policies should promote cooperative relations and not only market mechanisms. 
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1 Introduction 
We are interested in studying the mechanisms through which technological procurement by govern-
ment-funded science organisations can have an impact on learning, innovation and, ultimately, perfor-
mance in their supplier firms.  
Inquiry into these mechanisms is important for several reasons. Policy makers and scholars are in-
creasingly emphasizing the role of public procurement as a demand-driven tool for stimulating and 
promoting innovation (Lember at al., 2015; Knutsson and Tomasson, 2014; Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009, 
Martin and Tang, 2007). Public procurement for innovation (PPI) is meant to stimulate innovation by 
shaping the demand environment and the economic landscape in which suppliers operate (Uyarra and 
Flanagan, 2010). In fact, contracts with procuring organisations that require the development of non-
routine technologies are likely to cause radical changes in suppliers’ activities, challenging them to sup-
ply cutting-edge products (Salter and Martin, 2001; Perrow, 1967). In such a context, the firm may need 
to adjust organisational structure and production, and develop technological solutions to meet the pub-
lic procurer’s request. PPI is thus likely to lead to radical innovations and lay the foundations for new 
markets, particularly in areas where market interest is suboptimal owing to high risk and uncertainty 
(Mazzucato, 2016; Lember et al., 2015). 
But how exactly does PPI affect a firm’s performance? The evidence concerning its effectiveness is 
largely anecdotal, lacking a clear theoretical and empirical basis for understanding how public procurers 
actually influence firms’ innovation capabilities and performance and the channels through which this 
creates spillovers in the market (Åberg and Bengtson, 2015; Georghiou et al., 2014).  
This paper aims to fill that gap. We address the basis of the innovation procurement process by in-
quiring into what works and how. Our focus is on the mechanisms that explain how public procurers 
can support learning and innovation in their industrial partners, and how these buyer-supplier relation-
ships influence the latter’s performance.  
In this paper we propose a conceptual framework rooted in the PPI literature on interaction modes 
between economic actors (i.e. public buyers and private suppliers) as fundamental drivers of innovation 
and firms’ potential success (Sorenson, 2017; Edquist et al., 2015; Edquist and Zubala-Iturriagagoitia, 
2012; Williamson, 2008; Paulraj et al., 2008; Swink et al., 2007; Lundvall, 1985; Rothwell, 1984). The liter-
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ature on the procurement of science organisations that operate large-scale research infrastructures 
(RIs)2 offers interesting insights on the way in which such centres act as risk takers, reducing suppliers’ 
perceived risk in undertaking projects at the frontier of science (Unnervik, 2009); it underlines industrial 
knowledge spillovers generated in the economy through their procurement activity (Nilsen and Anelli, 
2016; Autio et al., 2004; Bianchi-Streit et al., 1984; Schmied, 1977). Industrial suppliers benefit from de-
mand-side learning and interactions with the research organisations, which in turn can strengthen their 
own performance. The benefits acquired by first-tier suppliers can then be transferred onward to other 
companies that are part of the supply network (Science|Business, 2015; Nordberg et al., 2003).  
The testing ground for our study is the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), the 
world’s leading laboratory for experimental particle physics. For our purposes, CERN offers an ideal case 
study. Its mission is not only to study the basic constituents of matter, but also to advance the frontier 
of technology and maximise the impact of the science, technology and know-how that it produces on 
industry and the society as a whole (Lebrun and Taylor, 2017). Many technologies developed for CERN 
have found applications in other sectors – from aerospace to medicine – and have addressed societal 
challenges in health, energy, environment and other fields (Amaldi, 2012). CERN is a “learning environ-
ment” for industrial supplier companies. Autio (2014) and Bianchi-Streit et al. (1984) show the Organisa-
tion’s impact on suppliers’ capacity to develop new products, generate organisational innovation, and 
acquire technological and market learning.  
To answer our research questions, in 2017 we conducted an online survey addressed to CERN suppli-
ers, building a unique data base on the types of goods and services delivered by each firm, the type of 
relationship established with CERN, the variety of learning and performance benefits enjoyed, and the 
benefits to second-tier suppliers.  
Initially we test a set of research hypotheses with an ordered logit model to investigate the correla-
tions of CERN suppliers’ performance (sales, profits, and development activities) with determinants sug-
gested by the PPI literature. Then we use Bayesian Network analysis (BN) (Ben-Gal, 2007; Pearl, 2000), 
for a more in-depth examination of the interlinks between the variables that explain suppliers’ perfor-
mance. 
We contribute to the literature on PPI from at least three standpoints. First, we offer a work on an 
under-researched area in the economic literature on the impact of PPI at firm level, by disentangling 
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some of the channels through which this effect may be produced and pointing out some interactions 
among them.  
Second, we innovate methodologically both by constructing new indicators and by showing that 
multiple causal linkages between the procurement relations are better captured by combining BNs as a 
complement to standard econometric models, in line with the idea that the proper evaluation of public 
investments and their results “requires new methods, metrics and indicators” (Mazzucato, 2015: 9). 
Third, we put “some more meat on the bones” of the question of governance structure. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the only paper that accords proper importance to the different governance struc-
tures and to their differential impact on suppliers’ performance in a context of risky, uncertain, innova-
tive and transaction–specific investments. 
We attain three main results.  
1) In line with the predictions of transaction cost theory, recently revived by the Global Value Chains 
literature (Gereffi et al., 2005), our findings indicate that CERN’s procurement has a significant impact 
on suppliers’ performance when cooperative relations are in place, and a more modest impact in the 
case of arm’s length market relations.  
2) The benefits of Big Science procurement spill over to second-tier suppliers, creating more wide-
spread impact on firms across the entire innovation supply chain.  
3) The heterogeneity of firms does matter. The impact on the suppliers’ performance depends criti-
cally on their absorptive capacity.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual model and our research 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design, the descriptive statistics of the survey responses and 
the statistical approaches to processing them. The results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes 
with a discussion of policy implications, caveats and suggestions for future research. 
2 The conceptual framework: theoretical foundations and research 
hypotheses  
Innovation is a complex process that takes time and is influenced by multiple factors (Håkansson et al., 
2009; Phillips et al., 2006; Dosi et al., 1988). This complexity induces firms to interact with other organi-
sations for knowledge exchange and technological learning, so that interactive learning becomes a fun-
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damental driver of innovation (Cano-Kollmann et al., 2017; Edquist, 2011; Rothwell, 1994; Lundvall, 1993 
and 1985). Chesbrough (2003) defines open innovation as an intentional exchange of inflows and out-
flows of knowledge between a firm and external parties to accelerate the firm’s internal innovation. Von 
Hippel (1986) observes that the users and suppliers were sometimes more important as functional 
sources of innovation than the product manufacturers themselves. Emphasising the need for communi-
cation with the user side of innovations, Von Hippel introduced the term “lead-users”, defined as “users 
whose present strong needs will become general in a market place months or years in the future” (von 
Hippel, 1986: 791).  
This line of argument implies not only that the development and diffusion of innovations through 
PPI depend on user-producer interaction in the procurement process (Newcombe, 1999; Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1979), but also that science organisations, such as CERN, can be seen as “lead-users” acting 
as learning environments for suppliers, who often strive to meet the stringent technological specifica-
tions of the projects planned (Unnervik, 2009). Autio et al. (2004) argue that communication and inter-
action in the dyad consisting of big science and industry mainly take the form of technological learning 
by the latter from the former.  
2.1 Relationships and governance structures 
The most common way in which PPI has been seen as influencing innovation has been as a channel for 
the flow of information and interactions among economic actors (Georghiou et al., 2014; Edquist and 
Zubala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012; Nordberg at al., 2003). The neo-institutional theory of the firm sees pro-
curement as a form of outsourcing in a context of incomplete contracts aimed at minimising transaction 
costs (Williamson, 2008 and 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Coase, 1937). The extent of the interchange 
of knowledge among companies varies considerably according to their mode of participation in the sup-
ply network and depends on the type of relations that they entertain with other firms. The firms’ own 
way of operating within the network is then embedded in the notion of governance structures of the 
supply network (Williamson, 1991), which determines bilateral dependency among the members of a 
supply network, the degree to which they interact and cooperate, and hence the possibility of mutual 
learning.  
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Williamson (2008: 10) indicates that the heterogeneous set of buyer-supplier relationships can be 
simplified into five main governance structures, i.e. markets, credible (or modular), benign (or relational), 
muscular (or captive), and hierarchy3: as bilateral dependency is built up through transaction–specific 
investments, the efficient governance of contractual relations moves from simple market exchange to 
hybrid contracting (e.g. modular, captive), then to relational and finally to hierarchy (Williamson, 2008) 
to eliminate the risk of agents’ opportunistic behaviour. The hierarchical structure is characterised by 
vertical integration and fully in-house production. In the context of our study, we focus on the relation-
ship between CERN and its supplier firms, and between these suppliers and other firms as subcontrac-
tors. That is, we leave aside the hierarchical mode of governance and focus on the others. In particular, 
we distinguish between market governance, relational governance and hybrid governance.  
 Market governance involves simple transactions that are not difficult to codify in contracts 
and where the central governance mechanism is price. Such transactions require little or no 
formal cooperation or dependency actors. 
 Relational governance implies that buyer and supplier cooperate regularly to deal with com-
plex information that is not easily transmitted or learned. This produces frequent interac-
tions and knowledge-sharing in order to remedy the incompleteness of contracts and deal 
flexibly with all possible contingencies. Relational governance consists of linkages that take 
time to build and that generate mutual reliance, so the costs and difficulties of switching to a 
new partner tend to be high. 
 Hybrid forms of governance comprise modular and captive governance forms. Both are hy-
brid forms lying somewhere between market and relational governance, in which transac-
tions may incorporate some degree of cooperation and knowledge exchange between the 
parties, depending on the complexity of the information to be exchanged. In this case link-
ages between the public procurer and suppliers are more substantial than in simple markets, 
but less than in relational governance.  
Our hypothesis is that, in the context of large-scale RI procurement, these systems of governance be-
tween science organisations and supplier firms are shaped by the level of innovation in procurement or-
ders and the money volume of the orders received by the suppliers. The level of innovation is a multifac-
eted construct, related to the notions of technological novelty and technological uncertainty. Techno-
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logical novelty refers to the product’s newness with respect to the supplying firms’ competencies and to 
the worldwide state of the art. The level is a crucial element in relationship outcomes – it is expected to 
be positively associated with learning potential (Autio, 2014; Autio et al., 2004; Schmied, 1977 and 1987). 
Technological uncertainty refers to the likelihood of the products’ specifications being achieved. Both 
novelty and uncertainty play key roles in the willingness of parties to share knowledge and are expected 
to impact positively on the innovation capabilities of suppliers. In the case of CERN, for instance, the la-
boratory has often helped firms to develop new product lines by testing prototypes. This approach has 
both reduced the uncertainty surrounding the order (Unnervik, 2009) and provided an initial impetus to 
the firm’s innovation capability. The size of the order (or the sum of the value of orders received by the 
same company) is also expected to shape the interaction modes between science public organisations 
and industrial suppliers. This leads to our first research hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1. The level of innovation and the value of orders shape the relationship between CERN 
and its suppliers. Specifically, the larger and the more innovative the order, the more likely the CERN 
and its suppliers are to establish relational governance, as a remedy for contract incompleteness, agents’ 
opportunism, and suboptimal investments on both sides.  
2.2 Learning, innovation and market outcomes  
Potential outcomes accruing to suppliers from their relationships with science organizations are likely to 
vary considerably according to the governance structures. Following Autio et al. (2004) and Bianchi-
Streit et al. (1984), we distinguish three categories of cooperation outcomes. 
Innovation outcomes. These relate to the development of new products, services and technologies, 
and changes in the technological status of the suppliers (e.g. the acquisition of patents or other forms of 
intellectual property rights, or IPR). 
Learning outcomes. These relate to the acquisition of technical know-how, improvement in the quali-
ty of products and services, changes in production processes, organisational and management activities 
initiated thanks to the supply relationships. 
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Market penetration outcomes. These include both the direct acquisition of new customers and mar-
ket benefits in terms of improved reputation as the big-science centre acts as a marketing reference for 
the company.  
The achievement of one or more of these outcomes by suppliers depends on the governance struc-
ture that shapes the RI-company dyad. For instance, high technological novelty and transaction-specific 
investments characterise highly structured types of governance (i.e. relational). Thus, we expect innova-
tion outcomes to be associated with tighter inter-firm linkages.  
By contrast, market-related outcomes are likely to accrue also to those companies that establish a 
less structured relationship with the science organisation. In fact, Autio et al. (2004) and Bianchi-Streit 
et al. (1984) document that reputational benefits are likely to accrue simply from becoming the supplier 
of a world-renowned laboratory like CERN. In that case, the science organisation is exploited by the 
firms as a signal for other potential customers in the market. These leads to our second research hy-
pothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. The relational governance of procurement is positively related to innovation and 
learning outcomes for the suppliers of large-scale science centres. 
2.3 Supplier’s performance 
Governance structures are instrumental to innovation, learning and market outcomes. These outcomes, 
which we call “intermediate”, impact in turn on suppliers’ performance (Autio et al., 2004; Bianchi-Streit 
et al., 1984). In order to investigate this specific aspect, we look at different performance variables: sales, 
profit dynamics, and business development (i.e. establishing a new R&D unit, starting a new business 
unit, entering a new market).  
Nordberg et al. (2003) and Bianchi-Streit et al. (1984) provide evidence that the rigorous technical 
requirements of large-scale RIs may lead firms to make significant changes in their production processes 
and activities, which may have adverse effects on their performance, in some extreme cases even result-
ing in bankruptcy. However, we argue that the effects of learning, innovation and market penetration on 
economic performance (sales and/or profits) and development activities are expected to be generally 
positive. This is reflected in our third research hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 3. Innovation, learning and market penetration by the large-scale science centres’ sup-
pliers are likely to impact positively on their performance.  
2.4 Governance structures and outcomes in second-tier suppliers 
A few studies have shown that innovation and knowledge diffusion in the RI-industry dyad is not lim-
ited to first-tier suppliers but can spread throughout the entire supply network (Autio et al., 2004; 
Nordberg et al., 2003). As in the case of first-tier suppliers, the extent to which second-tier suppliers 
benefit from innovation, learning and market outcomes depends heavily on the governance structures 
they establish with the first-tier suppliers. We look at the outcomes for second-tier suppliers, such as in-
creased technical know-how, product and process innovation, as well as market outcomes. Thus, we 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4. In the case of relational governance of procurement, the innovation, learning and 
market outcomes are not confined solely to first-tier suppliers but spread to second-tier suppliers as 
well.  
 
Our research hypotheses finalise our conceptual model, which is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
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3 Research design, descriptive statistics and methods 
3.1 The survey  
In order to test our hypotheses, we developed a broad on-line survey addressed to CERN’s supplier com-
panies, conducted between February and July 2017. CERN granted us access to its procurement database, 
producing a list of the suppliers that received at least one order larger than EUR 6,1004 between 1995 and 
2015. The database counts some 4,20o suppliers from 47 countries and a total of about 33,500 orders for 
EUR 3 billion. About 60% of the firms (2,500) had a valid e-mail contact at the time of the survey.  
Following our conceptual model, we structured the on-line questionnaire in three sections, bearing 
respectively on: i) the relationship between the respondent supplier and CERN, ii) the impact of CERN’s 
procurement on the supplier’ performance as perceived by the supplier, and iii) the relationship between 
the firm and its subcontractors. We used both closed-ended questions and five-point Likert scale ques-
tions to enable companies to say how much they agreed or disagreed with every statement.  
Respondents numbered 669, or 25% of the target population (i.e. companies with an e-mail contact). 
This response rate can be considered satisfactory for this kind of survey and is of comparable size to 
similar previous surveys (Autio et al., 2003; Bianchi-Streit et al., 1984).  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
The survey produced responses from 669 suppliers in 33 countries, mainly from Switzerland (27%), 
France (20%), Germany (14%), Italy (8%), the UK (7%), and Spain (5%). 
Respondent firms are mainly medium-sized and small companies (43% and 26% respectively). Large 
companies made up 23% of the sample and very large companies the remaining 8%.5 On average, each 
supplier processed 12 orders (standard deviation = 36) and received EUR 63,000 per order (standard de-
viation = EUR 126,000). Before becoming a CERN supplier, 45% of the respondents stated that they had 
had previous experience in working with large laboratories such as CERN.  
The sample includes firms that supplied a highly diversified range of products and services to CERN, 
from off-the-shelf and standard commercial products to highly innovative, cutting-edge products and 
services (Table 1). 
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In the delivery of the procurement order, 52% received some additional inputs from CERN staff, be-
sides the order specifications, and 20% engaged in frequent cooperation with CERN (Table 2). 
Table 1. Innovation level of products delivered to CERN6 
Innovation level of products and services N 
 Products and services with significant customisation or requiring technological development 331 
Mostly off-the-shelf products and services with some customisation 239 
Advanced commercial off-the-shelf or advanced standard products and services 172 
Cutting-edge products /services requiring R&D or co-design involving the CERN staff 158 
Commercial off-the-shelf and standard products and/or services 110 
Table 2. Governance structure 
Governance structure N % 
During the relationship with CERN, we carried out the project(s) on the basis of …   
the specifications provided, but with additional inputs (clarifications, cooperation on 
some activities) from CERN staff 
349 52% 
the specifications provided with full autonomy and little interaction with CERN staff 181 28% 
frequent and intense interactions with CERN staff 133 20% 
 
To examine the relationship between CERN and its suppliers more closely, we asked about specific as-
pects of their mode of interaction (Table 3).  
Table 3. Specific aspects of the supply relationship. Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. 
Question N Mean 
% of suppliers that 
agree or strongly agree 
During the relationship with CERN …    
We were given access to CERN laboratories and facilities 668 3.18 43% 
We always knew whom to contact in CERN to obtain additional information 669 4.24 86% 
We always understood what CERN staff required us to deliver 669 4.21 87% 
CERN staff always understood what we communicated to them 669 4.19 87% 
During unexpected situations, CERN and our company dialogued to reach a 
solution without insisting on contractual clauses 
668 3.91 68% 
 
Suppliers were asked about the impact that the procurement relationship with CERN had on their 
company (Table 4). In terms of learning outcomes, 55% said that thanks to the relationship, they had 
increased their technical know-how; 48% reported that they had improved products and services. Inno-
vative outcomes were achieved as a result of new knowledge acquired; 282 firms stated they had man-
aged to develop new products, and new services or new technologies were introduced by 203 and 138 
suppliers respectively.7  
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The responses on market penetration outcomes reveal that 62% of firms used CERN as a marketing 
reference and declared that they had improved their reputation as suppliers. Around 20% of the firms 
said they had gained new customers of different types.  
In line with our hypotheses, we expected an improvement of suppliers’ performance thanks to the 
work carried out for CERN. And in fact 18% of firms reported that they had increased sales in other mar-
kets (i.e. apart from sales to CERN). Most of firms interviewed experienced no financial loss and did not 
face risk of bankruptcy as a consequence of CERN procurement.  
Table 4. Innovation outcomes and economic performance. Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. 
Question N Mean 
% of suppliers that 
agree or strongly agree 
Learning outcomes     
Thanks to CERN, supplier firms ….    
Acquired new knowledge about market needs and trends 668 3.19 35% 
Improved technical know-how 668 3.54 55% 
Improved the quality of products and services  669 3.41 48% 
Improved production processes 669 3.14 31% 
Improved R&D production capabilities 669 3.19 34% 
Improved management/organisational capabilities 669 3.12 28% 
Innovation outcomes    
Because of the work with CERN, supplier firms developed:    
New products 282   
New Services 203   
New technologies  138   
New patents, copyrights or other IPR 22   
None of the above  65   
Market penetration     
Because of the work with CERN, supplier firms …    
Used CERN as important marketing reference  669 3.61 62% 
Improved credibility as supplier  669 3.68 62% 
Acquired new customers - firms in own country 669 2.73 23% 
Acquired new customers - firms in other countries 666 2.69 23% 
Acquired new customers - research centres and facilities like CERN  668 2.66 24% 
Acquired new customers - other large-scale research centres  669 2.49 14% 
Acquired new customers - smaller research institutes/universities  669 2.71 22% 
Performance    
Because of the work with CERN, supplier firms …    
Increased total sales (excluding CERN) 669 2.63 18% 
Reduced production costs 669 2.30 3% 
Increased overall profitability 668 2.51 12% 
Established a new R&D team/unit 669 2.22 6% 
Started a new business unit 669 2.14 6% 
Entered a new market  669 2.46 16% 
Experienced some financial loss 669 2.04 7% 
Faced risk of bankruptcy 339 1.56 1% 
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Table 5 and Table 6 report responses related to the relationship between the respondent firms (first-
tier suppliers) and their subcontractors (second-tier suppliers), focusing on the type of benefits accruing 
to the latter.  
More specifically, firms were asked whether they had mobilised any subcontractor to carry out the 
CERN project(s), and if so to list the number of subcontractors and their countries as well as the way in 
which the subcontractors were selected. In all, 256 firms (38%) mobilised about 500 subcontractors (av-
eraging 2 per firm) in 26 countries. Good reputation, trust developed during previous projects, and geo-
graphic proximity were the most commonly reported means of selection of these partners. The remain-
ing 413 firms (62%) did not mobilise any subcontractor, mainly because they already had the necessary 
competencies in-house.  
The types of product provided by subcontractors to the firms interviewed are listed in Table 5 under 
the label “Innovation level of products and services”. For instance, 80 firms (31%) declared that their 
subcontractors supplied them with mostly off-the-shelf products and services with some customisation; 
only 3% said that they had supplied cutting-edge products and services.   
Table 5. Innovation level of products and governance structure within the second-tier relationship.  
Innovation level of products and services N % 
Mostly off-the-shelf products and services with some customisation 80 31% 
Significant customisation or requiring technological development 44 20% 
Advanced commercial off-the-shelf or advanced standard products and services  40 16% 
Commercial off-the-shelf and standard products and/or services 32 13% 
Cutting-edge products /services requiring R&D or co-design involving the CERN staff 8 3% 
Mix of the above  52 20% 
Total  256 100% 
Governance structure   
Our subcontractors processed the order(s) on the basis of …   
our specifications, but with additional inputs (clarifications, cooperation on some ac-
tivities) from our company 
119 46% 
our specifications with full autonomy and little interaction with our company  87 34% 
frequent and intense interactions with our company  50 20% 
Total  256 100% 
 
As regards the governance structure between first-tier and second-tier suppliers, 46% of the firms 
gave their subcontractors additional inputs beyond the basic specifications, such as clarifications or co-
operation on some activities; 34% said that the subcontractors operated with full autonomy, while 20% 
established frequent and intense interactions with their subcontractors.  
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Table 6. Benefits for second-tier suppliers as perceived by first-tier suppliers.  
Question N Mean 
% of suppliers that 
agree or strongly agree 
To what extent do you think that your subcontractors benefitted from working 
with your company on CERN project(s)? Our subcontractors … 
   
Increased technical know-how 256 3.14 37% 
Innovated products or processes 256 2.91 23% 
Improved production process 256 2.89 18% 
Attracted new customers 256 2.89 21% 
 
According to the perception of respectively 37% and 23% of the supplier firms, subcontractors may 
have increased their technical know-how or innovated their own products and services, thanks to the 
work carried out in relation to the CERN order (Table 6). 
3.3 The Empirical Investigation  
The data were processed by two different approaches. The first was standard ordered logistic models, 
with suppliers’ performance, variously measured, as the dependent variable. The aim is to determine 
correlations between suppliers’ performance and some of the possible determinants suggested by the 
PPI literature. Second was a Bayesian Network (BN) analysis to study more thoroughly the mechanisms 
within the science organisation or RI-industry dyad that could potentially lead to a better performance 
of suppliers.  
BNs are probabilistic graphical models that estimate a joint probability distribution over a set of ran-
dom variables entering in a network (Salini and Kenett, 2009; Ben-Gal, 2007) BNs are increasingly gain-
ing currency in the socio-economic disciplines (Florio et al., 2017; Sirtori et al., 2017; Cugnata et al., 2017; 
Ruiz-Ruano Garcia et al., 2014). By estimating the conditional probabilistic distribution among variables 
and arranging them in a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), BNs are both mathematically rigorous and intu-
itively understandable. They enable an effective representation of the whole set of interdependencies 
among the random variables without distinguishing dependent and independent ones. If target variables 
are selected, BNs are suitable to explore the chain of mechanisms by which effects are generated (in our 
case, CERN suppliers’ performance) producing results that can significantly enrich the ordered logit 
models (Pearl, 2000).  
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3.4 Variables 
We pre-treated the survey responses in order to obtain the variables that were entered into the statisti-
cal analysis, in line with our conceptual framework (see the full list in Table 7). The type of procurement 
order was characterised by the following variables:  
 High-tech supplier is a binary variable, taking the value of 1 for high-tech suppliers, i.e. those 
companies that in the survey reported having supplied CERN with products and services with sig-
nificant customisation or requiring technological development, or cutting-edge products/services 
requiring R&D or co-design involving the CERN staff.  
 Second-tier high-tech supplier. We apply the same methodology as for the first-tier suppliers.  
 EUR per order is the average value (in euro) of the orders the supplier company received from 
CERN. This continuous variable was discretised to be used in the BN analysis. It takes the value 1 
if it is above the mean (EUR 63, 000) and 0 otherwise.  
Two types of variable were constructed in order to measure the governance structures. One is a set 
of binary variables distinguishing between the Market, Hybrid and Relational modes of interaction. 
The second is a more complex construct that we call Governance.  
 Market is a binary variable taking the value 1 if suppliers processed CERN orders with full au-
tonomy and little interaction with CERN, and 0 otherwise. The same codification was used for 
the second-tier relationship (Second-tier market).  
 Hybrid is a binary variable taking the value 1 if suppliers processed CERN orders on the basis of 
specifications provided but with additional inputs (clarifications, cooperation on some activi-
ties) from CERN staff and 0 otherwise. The same codification was used in the second-tier rela-
tionship (Second-tier hybrid).  
 Relational is a binary variable taking the value 1 if suppliers processed CERN orders with fre-
quent and intense interaction with CERN staff and 0 otherwise. The same codification was used 
in the second-tier relationship (Second-tier relational). 
 Governance was constructed by combining the five items reported in Table 3. Each was trans-
formed into a binary variable by assigning the value of 1 if the respondent firm agreed or strong-
ly agreed with the statement and 0 otherwise. Then, following Cano-Kollmann et al. (2017), the 
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Governance variable was obtained as the sum of the five binary items (its value accordingly 
ranging from 0 to 5). We test the internal reliability of this variable by using Cronbach’s Alpha, 
which worked out to 0.74, hence above the commonly accepted threshold value of 0.7 (Tavolok 
and Dennick, 2011), indicating a high degree of internal reliability that the items examined actu-
ally are measuring the same underlying concepts. Thus, the higher the value of this variable, the 
more the interaction mode between suppliers and CERN approximates a relational-type govern-
ance structure.  
Intermediate outcomes are captured by the following variables (Table 4): 
 Learning. Each of the six items in this category of outcomes was transformed into a binary vari-
able, and then combined into a variable obtained as the sum of the six binary items, ranging in 
value from 0 to 6 (Alpha = 0.90.) 
 Innovation. This was measured by four binary variables taking the value 1 if the respondent 
ticked the corresponding option (new products, new services, new technologies, new patents or 
other IPR) and 0 otherwise. 
 Market penetration is measured by two variables.  
o Market reference, defined as the sum of two binary items, hence ranging in value from 0 to 2 
(Alpha = 0.78). The items were: “used CERN as an important marketing reference” and “im-
proved credibility as a supplier”.  
o New customers. Like learning outcomes, this variable was constructed as the sum of five bi-
nary items, hence ranging in value for 0 to 5 (Alpha = 0.88). The items were: “new customers 
in our country”; “new customers in other countries”; “research centres similar to CERN”; 
“other large-scale research centres”; “other smaller research institutes”. 
Suppliers’ performance was measured by the following variables (Table 4):  
 Sales-profits is the sum of three binary items: “increased sales”, “reduced production costs” and 
“increased overall profitability” (Alpha = 0.84). Its value ranges from 0 to 3 and measures suppli-
ers’ performance in terms of financial results.  
 Development is the sum of three binary items: “Established a new R&D team/unit”, “Started a 
new business” and “Entered a new market” (Alpha = 0.86). Ranging in value from 0 to 3, this var-
17 
 
iable measures suppliers’ performance from the standpoint of development activities relating to 
a longer-term perspective than sales–profits.  
 Losses and risk is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the firm agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement “experienced some financial losses” and o otherwise. 
 Second-tier benefits is a variable constructed as the sum of four binary items (Alpha = 0.89) and 
thus ranges in value from 0 to 4. It captures outcomes within second-tier suppliers (Table 6).  
We control for several variables that may play a role in the relationship between the governance 
structures and the suppliers’ performance. 
 Firm’s size is coded as 1 if the supplier is small, 2 if medium-sized; 3 if large and 4 if very large. 
 Previous experience. This is measured by three binary variables, whose value is 1 if the supplier 
ticked the corresponding option and o otherwise. The options were related to previous working 
experience with:  
o large laboratories similar to CERN (experience with large labs); 
o research institutions and universities (experience with universities);  
o non-science-related customers (experience with non-science); 
 Relationship duration is calculated as the difference between the years of the supplier’s last and 
first orders from CERN. It takes the value 1 if it is above the mean (5 years) and 0 otherwise.  
 Time since last order is calculated as the difference between the year of the survey (2017) and the 
year in which the supplier received its last order. It takes the value 1 if it is above the mean (4 
years) and 0 otherwise. 
 Geo-proximity is a binary variable measuring whether the supplier selected its subcontractors on 
the basis of geographical proximity.  
 Country is coded 1 if the supplier is located in a very poorly balanced country; 2 if the country is 
poorly balanced, 3 if it is well balanced. According to CERN’s definition, a “well-balanced” 
member state is one that achieves “well balanced industrial return coefficients”. The return coef-
ficient is the ratio between the member state’s percentage share of procurement and the per-
centage share of its contribution to the budget. Receiving contracts above this ratio means being 
well balanced; below, the country is defined as poorly balanced. CERN’s procurement rules tend 
to favour firms from poorly balanced countries over those in well balanced countries.  
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Table 7. Econometric analysis: list of variables.  
Variable N Mean Min Max 
EUR per order *** 669 0.34 0 1 
High-tech supplier 669 0.58 0 1 
Governance structures      
Market*** 669 0.27 0 1 
Hybrid 669 0.53 0 1 
Relational*** 669 0.20 0 1 
Governance** 669 3.72 0 5 
Intermediate outcomes     
Learning***  669 2.30 0 6 
Innovation      
New products *** 669 0.54 0 1 
New services *** 669 0.39 0 1 
 New technologies***  669 0.27 0 1 
 New patents-other IPR*** 669 0.04 0 1 
Market penetration      
Market reference*** 669 1.23 0 2 
New customers** 669 1.05 0 5 
Performance      
Sales-profits** 669 0.33 0 3 
Development*** 669 0.28 0 3 
Losses and risk* 669 0.06 0 1 
Second-tier relation variables      
Second-tier high-tech supplier 256 0.37 0 1 
Governance structures     
Second-tier market* 256 0.20 0 1 
Second-tier hybrid 256 0.46 0 1 
Second-tier relational* 256 0.34 0 1 
 Second-tier benefits* 256 3.14 1 4 
Geo-proximity 256 0.48 0 1 
Control variables      
Relationship duration** 669 0.30 0 1 
Time since last order 669 0.20 0 1 
Experience with large labs** 669 0.70 0 1 
Experience with universities* 669 0.85 0 1 
Experience with non-science 669 0.96 0 1 
Firm’s size 669 1.83 1 4 
Country 669 2.03 1 3 
Asterisks denote statistical differences in the distribution of variables between high-tech and low-tech suppliers. ***p < 0.01; **p < 
0.05; *p < 0.10. Depending on the distribution of variables, both Pearson’s chi^2 test and Fisher’s exact test were used.  
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4 The Results 
4.1 Ordered logistic models 
We used ordered logistic models to analyse correlations between CERN suppliers’ performance and a set 
of determinant variables indicated by the PPI literature. Specifically, we looked at the impact of different 
governance structures on the performance of first-tier suppliers, controlling for their learning, innova-
tion and market penetration outcomes and other order-specific and firm-specific variables. Table 8 and 
Table 9 report estimates of these regressions with Sales-profits and Development as dependent variables.  
As column 1 in Table 8 shows, by comparison with the market interaction modes, the relational and 
hybrid structures of governance are positively and significantly correlated with the probability of in-
creasing sales and/or profits. These variables remain statistically significant also when the model is ex-
tended to include some specific aspects of the CERN-supplier relationship (column 2). Given the struc-
ture of governance, a collaborative relationship between CERN and its suppliers in unexpected situa-
tions, enabling suppliers to access CERN labs and facilities, increases the probability of improving sup-
pliers’ economic results. Controlling for learning, innovation and market penetration outcomes (column 
3), we find that the governance structures lose their statistical significance, while improvements in sales 
and/or profits are more likely to occur where there are innovative activities (such as new products, ser-
vices, patents). Moreover, the strong significance (p < 0.01) of Market reference and New customers indi-
cates that better economic results stem from the ability to exploit CERN as a “door opener” in the mar-
ket. The role of these intermediate outcomes is confirmed even when other control variables are added 
(column 4). These results still hold when the binary governance structure variables are replaced by the 
Governance construct (Columns 5-7).  
In Table 9 the dependent variable is Development. These estimates confirm the foregoing results with 
two differences. One is the very important role of Learning for developmental activities (p<0.01); the 
second is the effect of firm size: the larger the supplier, the greater the probability of establishing a new 
R&D team, new business or entering new markets (p<0.10).  
The ordered logistic models provide interesting insights into the variables that affect suppliers’ per-
formance. In particular, they show that learning, innovation and market penetration outcomes are cru-
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cial in explaining the probability of increases in sales, reductions in costs, greater profitability or more 
developmental activities in CERN suppliers.  
Table 8. Ordered logistic estimates. Dependent variable: Sales-profits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance struc-
tures 
       
Relational 1.17(0.27)*** 0.96(0.29)*** 0.38(0.36) 0.40(0.39)    
Hybrid 0.61 (0.24)** 0.43(0.25)* 0.13(0.31) 0.08(0.33)    
Governance     0.44(0.10)*** -0.06(0.28) -0.14(0.29) 
Access to CERN labs and 
facilities 
 0.43(0.18)** -0.09(0.22) 0.07(0.24)  0.02(0.38) 0.27(0.41) 
Knowing whom to con-
tact in CERN to get ad-
ditional information 
 0.27(0.32) 0.69(0.43) 0.73(0.46)  0.75(0.48) 0.88(0.51) 
Understanding CERN 
requests by the firm 
 0.33(0.42) -0.30(0.47) -0.27(0.49)  -0.26(0.55) -0.14(0.59) 
Understanding firm re-
quests by CERN staff 
 0.27(0.39) 0.26(0.48) 0.32(0.50)  0.32(0.61) 0.47(0.63) 
Collaboration between 
CERN and firm to face 
unexpected situations 
 0.47(0.21)** -0.09(0.28) -0.17(0.30)  ------- ------- 
Intermediate out-
comes 
       
Learning   0.14(0.06)** 0.11(0.06)*  0.15(0.06)** 0.11(0.06)* 
Innovation        
New products   0.57(0.28)** 0.65(0.28)**  0.55(0.27)** 0.63(0.28)** 
New services   0.67(0.27)** 0.60(0.28)**  0.69(0.27)*** 0.62(0.27)** 
New technologies   -0.01(0.28) 0.006(0.29)  0.00(0.27) 0.02(0.27) 
New patents-other IPR   0.77(0.40)* 0.86(0.50)*  0.83(0.50)* 0.93(0.50)* 
Market penetration        
Market reference   0.49(0.19)** 0.58(0.21)***  0.50(0.19)*** 0.59(0.21)*** 
New customers   0.50(0.07)*** 0.50(0.07)***  0.50(0.07)*** 0.49(0.07)*** 
Euro per order    0.07(0.12)   0.07(0.12) 
High-tech supplier    -0.04(0.27)   0.02(0.26) 
Control variables        
Relationship duration    -0.02(0.02)   -0.02(0.02) 
Time since last order    0.02(0.02)   0.02(0.02) 
Experience with large 
labs 
   0.13(0.27)   0.17(0.27) 
Experience with univer-
sities 
   -0.21(0.37)   -0.21(0.37) 
Experience with non-
science 
   0.15(0.75)   0.13(0.76) 
Firm’s size    -0.01(0.13)   -0.02(0.12) 
Country    -0.20(0.12)   -0.19(0.11) 
Constants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 669 668 668 660 669 668 660 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.03 0.20 0.21 
Proportional odds hp 
test (p-value) 
0.911 0.294 0.220 0.02 0.285 0.123 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% 10% level respectively. 
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Table 9. Ordered logistic estimates. Dependent variable: Development  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance 
structures 
       
Relational 1.53(0.29)*** 1.33(0.30)*** 0.92(0.35)*** 0.93(0.40)**    
Hybrid 0.62(0.27)** 0.46(0.28)* 0.17(0.33) 0.14(0.35)    
Governance     0.30(0.09)*** -0.28(0.30) -0.26(0.31) 
Access to CERN labs and 
facilities 
 0.46(0.20)** -0.35(0.26) -0.25(0.28)  0.04(0.41) 0.13(0.42) 
Knowing whom to con-
tact in CERN to get addi-
tional information 
 0.61(0.41) 0.86(0.48)* 0.92(0.56)  1.01(0.65) 1.11(0.65) 
Understanding CERN 
requests by the firm 
 -0.19(0.42) -0.46(0.48) -0.33(0.56)  -0.19(0.54) -0.06(0.64) 
Understanding firm re-
quests by CERN staff 
 0.12(0.43) -0.05(0.49) -0.04(0.57)  0.27(0.60) 0.27(0.66) 
Collaboration between 
CERN and firm to face 
unexpected situations 
 0.39(0.21)* -0.31(0.30) -0.30(0.31)  ------- ------- 
Intermediate 
outcomes 
       
Learning   0.36(0.07)*** 0.33(0.07)***  0.36(0.07)*** 0.32(0.07)*** 
Innovation        
New products   -0.01(0.27) -0.05(0.29)  -0.07(0.27) -0.03(0.28) 
New services   0.60(0.28)** 0.68(0.29)**  0.57(0.27)** 0.68(0.28)** 
New technologies   0.08(0.29) 0.10(0.30)  0.16(0.28) 0.16(0.28) 
New patents-other IPR   1.02(0.48)** 1.00(0.53)**  1.20(0.49)** 1.19(0.50)** 
Market penetration        
Market reference   0.53(0.21)*** 0.47(0.21)**  0.60(0.21)*** 0.54(0.21)*** 
New customers   0.19(0.08)** 0.20(0.08)**  0.18(0.08)** 0.18(0.08)** 
Euro per order    0.09(0.12)   0.07(0.12) 
High-tech supplier    0.00(0.28)   0.12(0.27) 
Control variables        
Relationship duration    -0.04(0.02)   -0.04(0.02) 
Time since last order    -0.03(0.03)   0.03(0.03) 
Experience with large 
labs 
   0.20(0.29)   0.20(0.29) 
Experience with univer-
sities 
   
-
1.00(0.34)*** 
  -0.98(0.35) 
Experience with non-
science 
   0.14(0.64)   0.13(0.63) 
Firm’s size    0.18(0.13)   0.20(0.11)* 
Country    -0.21(0.13)   -0.21(0.12)* 
Constants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 669 668 668 660 669 668 660 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.20 0.01 0.16 0.18 
Proportional odds hp 
test (p-value) 
0.931 0.235 0.217 0.020 0.431 0.601 0.003 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% 10% level respectively. 
4.2 Bayesian Network analysis 
In order to shed light on all the possible interlinkages between variables and look more deeply into the 
role of governance structures in determining suppliers’ performance, we use BN analysis, which makes it 
possible to visualise and estimate all direct and indirect interdependencies among the set of variables 
considered, including those relating to the second-tier suppliers. We test the four hypotheses that un-
derlie our conceptual framework and seek to disentangle the specific roles played by governance struc-
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tures, intermediate outcomes and firm-specific and order-specific characteristics in determining firms’ 
performance. 
Figure 2 shows the DAG of a BN where the governance structure is measured by the three binary var-
iables Relational, Hybrid and Market; in Figure 3, instead, the variable used is Governance. Both the BNs 
were estimated by applying the Bayesian Search algorithm (Heckerman et al., 1994). The strength of the 
relationship between the variables is indicated by the thickness of the arrows: the thicker the arrow, the 
stronger the dependency. Variables showing no links are excluded from both graphs.  
Figure 2 shows that both status as a high-tech supplier (i.e. providing CERN with highly innovative 
products/services) and the size of the order play a direct role in establishing both relational and hybrid 
interaction modes, in line with Hypothesis 1. By contrast, there are no strong links with the market-type 
governance structure.  
The BNs also confirm Hypothesis 2: innovation (i.e. new products, new services, new technologies 
and new patents) and learning outcomes depend directly on relational-type interactions. Actually, the 
variable Relational is strongly correlated with the development of new technologies and new products, 
whereas market-type governance is linked to the use of CERN as marketing reference or gaining in-
creased credibility on the market, which corroborates the idea that the fact of having become a supplier 
of CERN is likely to produce a reputational benefit.  
Some linkages among the intermediate outcomes emerge, suggesting that the cooperation with 
CERN spurs several changes in suppliers’ propensity to innovate. The DAG shows that learning out-
comes (e.g. improvements in technical know-how as well as in R&D and innovation capabilities) are as-
sociated with developing new technologies, while developing new patents and other IPR is linked to the 
acquisition of new customers.  
These intermediate outcomes are expected, in turn, to be associated with better firm performance 
(Hypothesis 3). This correlation, which the ordered logistic models documented, is confirmed and fur-
ther qualified by the BN analysis. In fact, the development of new products and the acquisition of new 
customers are linked chiefly to an increase in sales/profits, whereas new patents and other forms of IPR 
lead not only to higher sales/profits but also to a greater probability of developmental activities. The BN 
analysis also shows that the variables that measure suppliers’ performance are strongly linked with one 
23 
 
another, suggesting that the result tends to be an overall enhancement of firms’ performance, rather 
than gains involving specific aspects. 
 
Figure 2. Bayesian Network: the impact of different types of governance structures on firm performance. 
Governance structures are proxied by three binary variables: Relational, Hybrid, and Market.  
 
Hypothesis 4 is tested in the bottom of the DAG, where we look at the modes of interaction between 
first-tier and second-tier suppliers and the potential benefits accruing to the latter. The BN highlights a 
positive correlation between the governance structures and benefits for subcontractors, as perceived by 
CERN’s suppliers. An examination of the DAG as a whole clearly shows that the type of first-tier rela-
tionship between CERN and its direct suppliers is replicated in the second-tier relationships established 
between direct suppliers and subcontractors. This holds for both relational governance structures (the 
arc linking Relational and Second-tier relational) and market structures (the arc linking Market and Sec-
ond-tier market). Presumably, what drives this process is the degree of innovation and the complexity of 
the orders to be processed: supplying highly innovative products requires strong relationships not only 
between CERN and its direct suppliers but also between the latter and their own subcontractors in order 
to deal effectively with the uncertainty inherent in the development of new technologies at the frontier 
of science, where the risk of contract incompleteness and defection is very high. Finally, it is worth not-
ing the role of some control variables. Firm’s size is linked to the learning outcomes, which in turn relat-
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ed to innovation outcomes. As Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest, access to the network by suppliers is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for learning, which rather depends on the firm’s absorptive ca-
pacity. Large firms are more likely to absorb external knowledge and benefit from the supply network, 
because with respect to smaller companies they generally have higher levels of human capital and inter-
nal R&D activity, as well as the scale and resources required to manage a substantial array of innovation 
activities (Cano-Kollmann et al., 2017). Moreover, previous experience working with large-scale labs sim-
ilar to CERN is positively associated with the development of new technologies. By contrast, the suppli-
ers whose previous experience was with non-science-related customers are more likely to establish mar-
ket relationships with CERN. The DAG also shows that the possibility of accessing CERN’s research facil-
ities is linked to the development of new technologies, while collaborative behaviour in unexpected sit-
uations heightens the probability of carrying out development activities.  
This leads us to the network in Figure 3, where the variable Governance encapsulates these specific 
aspects of the supply relationships. The DAG confirms the main relationships discussed above; that is, 
the higher the value of the variable Governance, the greater the benefits enjoyed by CERN suppliers.  
 
 
Figure 3. Bayesian Network: the impact of different types of governance structures on firm performance. 
Governance is proxied by a five-item construct as described in Section 3.4. 
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The robustness of the networks was further checked through structure perturbation, which consists 
in checking the validity of the main relationships within the networks by varying part of them or mar-
ginalising some variables (Daly et al., 2011; Ding and Peng, 2005).5 
5 Conclusions  
This paper develops and empirically estimates a conceptual framework for determining how govern-
ment-funded science organisations can support firms’ performance through their procurement activity. 
By exploiting both logistic regression models and Bayesian Network analysis on CERN procurement, we 
find that: i) the learning, innovation and market penetration outcomes achieved by suppliers impact 
positively on their economic performance and development; ii) the suppliers involved in structured and 
collaborative relationships with CERN turn in better performance than companies involved in pure 
market transactions characterised by little or no cooperation. As our BNs reveal, relational-type govern-
ance structures channel information, facilitate the acquisition of technical know-how, provide access to 
scarce resources and reduce the uncertainty and risks associated with complex projects, thus enabling 
suppliers to enhance their performance and increase their development activities. These relationships 
hold not only between the public procurer and its direct suppliers but also between the latter and their 
subcontractors, suggesting that benefits spill over along the whole supply chain.  
Our findings are relevant both for policy makers and for Research Infrastructure managers. Given the 
large scale and complexity of RIs, parties are often unable to precisely specify in advance the features of 
the products and services needed for the construction of such infrastructures, so that intensive, costly 
and risky research and development activities are required. In this context, procurement relationships 
based solely on market and price mechanisms are not a suitable instrument for governing public pro-
curement, as they would not be able to deal with the uncertainty embedded in innovation procurement. 
Instead, if parties cooperate during contract execution, and specifically if a relational governance struc-
ture is established, not only are the requisite products and services more likely to be developed and de-
livered, but additional spill over benefits are generated in supplier firms. The patterns of these relation-
ships across members of the supply network influence the generation of innovation, helping to deter-
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mine whether and how quickly innovations are adopted so as to produce performance improvement in 
firms.  
In addition, we looked at suppliers “from within”, and our results highlight that firms’ heterogeneity 
is an important factor. The impact on suppliers’ performance produced by CERN procurement depends 
critically on firm size, on status as high-tech supplier, and on an array of other factors, including the ca-
pacity to develop new products and technologies to attract new customers via marketing, and the ability 
to establish fruitful collaborations with subcontractors.  
These results could help public science organisations to identify the most appropriate mode for car-
rying out their mission as a learning environment and policy makers to better design demand-side mis-
sion-oriented policies such as public procurement for innovation. Future research is needed for broader 
and more in-depth inquiry into the effects of RI-related public procurement on second-tier suppliers 
and possibly other levels of the supply chain.  
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